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Negotiating With the Soviet Union: The Diplomatic Dimension? 
By Ambassador Edward Rowny 
Longtime students of the Soviet Union fmd that certain developments there, taken at 
face value, are quite remarkable -- to mention only a few: 
US. Air Force C-5A cargo planes land at a Soviet nuclear test site to deliver 
equipment used in a joint verification experiment; US representatives walk and 
ski around the perimeter of a Soviet missile assembly plant in Siberia 
preparatory to the installation of a portal monitoring facility for U.S . personnel 
(required to implement the INF Treaty); Soviet representatives visit a similar 
US facility in Magna, Utah; Soviet leaders sign an agreement in Geneva to 
withdraw their forces from Afghanistan and implement it; the terms glasnost' 
and perestroika no longer require translation or explanation in the Western 
press; ideological differences between so-called "conservatives" and 
"reformers" in the Politburo are played out on the pages of Soviet newspapers; 
Ligachev's future is discussed in Western journals: is he in or out? Mass ethnic 
unrest occurs in the Baltic Republics and Central Asia, as well as 
demonstrations and riots in Armenia, and pogroms in Azerbaijan. 
There is a sense in the West that while the tiger, perhaps, is not changing his 
stripes, he is at least donning a new fur coat. Given the current state of affairs, is the 
Soviet Union, as Churchill said, "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma"? Are 
fundamental changes with unknown consequences occurring in the Soviet Union? The 
answer is that, while there is still much secrecy in the Soviet Union, there should be no 
mystery in the West over Soviet longer-term goals, motivations, strategy and tactics . If we 
are surprised by Soviet actions, it is because we have chosen unwisely to ignore the 
heritage of the past. 
----- - --- - - -
Several 19th century works indicated certain constants in the governance of Russia 
-- Tsarist or Soviet. Thus, Peter Chaadayev, a Russian intellectual, ~rote ·"talking about 
Russia one always imagines that one is talking about a country like the others; in reality, 
this is not so at all. Russia is a whole separate world, submissive to the will, caprice, 
fantasy of a single man, whether his name be Peter or Ivan, no matter-- in all instances the 
common element is the embodiment of arbitrariness ... . [a consequence is] her own 
enslavement and the enslavement of all the neighboring peoples .... " 
"We are one of those nations .... which exists only to provide some great lesson for 
the world." As a result of the publication of his ideas in the 1830's, Chaadayev was 
declared insane and put under arrest. He was not permitted to publish and his papers were 
confiscated. Considering the modem Soviet use of psychiatric "hospitalization" as an 
instrument of political control, indeed the past is prologue. 
A Frenchman, the Marquis de Custine, in his book Journey for Our Times, wrote: 
"I don't blame the Russians for being what they are, I blame them for pretending to be 
what we in the West are." 
The threads of history are evident in contemporary publications by authors who 
experienced the Soviet system from within, including Roy Medvedev, Alexander 
Solzhenitsyn, and Arkady Shevchenko. Even a more recent Soviet author with a best-
selling work (in the West)-- Mikhail Gorbachev, in his Perestroika, with all his concern 
for public relations, could not conceal occasional glimpses of longer-term Soviet goals. 
A paradoxical pattern of Russian national and cultural characteristics emerges from 
a study of such writings: conservative, yet revolutionary; anti-intellectual, but ideologically 
driven; insecure, yet aggressive and expansionist. It is a nation with rulers who claim to 
derive their power from the masses, yet they have established a central authority as strong 
and ruthless as any found under the Tsars. It is a nation that historically has bought, 
imported (and occasionally stolen) technology, whole industries , military equipment, 
-- ----
administrators, even certain aspects of religion and the arts, yet which boasts about its 
indigenous accomplishments. 
For seven years I was on the SALT II delegation as the representative of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff. Subsequently, I served two years as President Reagan's chief START 
negotiator . . For the following four years, I served as Special Advisor to the President and 
Secretary of State for Arms Control Matters. I have found that, if you take the time to 
study Russia's past, and do not ignore the evidence, it is possible to understand Soviet 
behavior and even to predict what Soviet leaders may do next. While there will always be 
secrets, there need be no mystery. 
I have found that, predictably, there is a great difference between what Soviet 
leaders say in public and what they permit to happen at the negotiating table. For public 
consumption, they profess that they are flexible. They have a special talent for recycling 
their more shopworn offers and reintroducing them as if they constituted new and 
substantive concessions. The theory is that they will compromise because they say they 
will. In practice, however, we can only reach a deal with the USSR when we have 
something significant to give up. Protected by the confidentiality of the conference room, 
Soviet negotiators adhere to their positions with the stubbornness of an army mule. At the 
table, they are anything but flexible. 
The reason for this tendency is clear. Guided by the Hegelian Dialectic and a 
Clausewitzian and Leninist penchant for tactics, Soviet leaders discern "contradictions" 
within the "camp of the adversary" and try to exploit them. Where the Soviet leaders see 
divergence in American or allied public sentiment on arms control issues, they jump at the 
possibility of exploiting it to their benefit. If the U.S. Congress can cause the 
Administration to concede key aspects of its negotiating position, then why should they 
(the Soviet leaders reason), expend any of their own precious negotiating capital to achieve 
their ends? The USSR does not deal in "bargaining chips." It does not make concessions 
in the spirit of "give-and-take" or as a "sign of good will." Rather, it considers unilateral 
concessions to be the mark of weakness, and weakness is not to be respected. Soviet 
leaders do, however, understand the need to appeal to Western notions of "good will" and 
"reciprocity" through our press, radio, and TV. They know that, through our media, they 
can strike in us a responsive chord. 
In the same vein, Soviet negotiators readily accept whatever concessions we offer, 
but see no cause to feel that they are obliged to reciprocate. Our unilateral concessions do 
not make Soviet representatives any more tractable. They assume that we had to make 
these concessions and, if anything, they dig their heels in deeper, insisting that we take 
their views "into account" on other issues. The Soviet negotiating strategy is , to put it 
simply, one of persistence (or obstinance). "What's mine is mine, and what's yours is 
negotiable" is more than a saying for Soviet representatives; it describes their negotiating 
style. Moreover, they truly believe -- as George Orwell wrote-- that to be equal they must 
be "more equal." 
The USSR simply does not approach negotiations as an exercise in "problem-
solving." Those of us who have negotiated with the USSR do not expect it to take this 
approach. We have come to understand that, whereas we would like to "work out 
solutions," the Soviet side believes that it must compete in order to "win. " Americans 
without the benefit of direct negotiating with the USSR tend to believe that the sheer weight 
of logic will lead both us and the other side toward mutually beneficial agreements. This 
tendency is understandable; it is part of our heritage. However, it only complicates the 
formidable tasks confronting the American negotiator. Soviet negotiators study our 
democratic system; they come to know its strengths and weaknesses and how to exploit 
them. Because they recognize the strength of commitment we have to our ideals, they 
know too well that our pluralistic society is susceptible to influence -- and sometimes 
outright manipulation-- to the adv::mtage of the USSR. 
After seven years of hard negotiations we have signed an INF Treaty. I support it, 
because it is verifiable and in our security interest. Nonetheless, under Gorbachev's 
leadership, the ups and downs of the INF negotiations contained classic examples of Soviet 
negotiating behavior. Even in "the end game" Soviet representatives would walk away 
from publicly announced positions, flip flop on issues, and stall to press for US 
concessions. In other words, it was business as usual. 
Since Soviet negotiating goals and tactics are elusive, but can be deduced from long 
practice, how should the United States respond? Based on my study of "the other side" 
and my personal experience in negotiating with Soviet representatives, I have developed 
what I call my "Ten Commandments for negotiating with the Soviet Union": 
1. Above all, remember the objective. The Soviet leaders have better 
defined, more clear-cut, longer-range strategic objectives than we do. They 
tend to think in terms of longer periods -- many years, if not decades; their 
tactics are to divert the other side from its primary goal and we are easily 
distracted and tend to lose sight of our main objective. These differences, 
which usually work to our disadvantage in negotiations, can be minimized if we 
refuse to be diverted and keep our main goal steadfastly in sight. 
2. Be patient. Moscow places arms control in a wider context than we do. 
Soviet representatives are prepared to wait for shifts in (what they call) the 
"correlation of forces " that serve their political ends. Americans are not patient. 
The Russians play chess; we play video games. If the other side does not agree 
swiftly to a US proposal, we assume that it must be faulty and that we must 
come up with a new offer. 
3. Keep secrets that concern negotiations. By tradition, history, and type 
of government, Soviet society is closed and secretive. The United States is an 
open society. In negotiations, the Russians play their cards close to the chest; 
we mostly place ours face up on the table. Most relevant data concerning our 
moves can be found in the public domain; it is infinitely more difficult for us to 
discover equivalent facts on the other side. 
4. Bear in mind the differences in the two political systems. It is obvious -
but the obvious is often overlooked - that American and Soviet political 
structures are fundamentally asymmetrical. In matters of foreign policy and 
negotiations, these differences are critical. The Russians have a centralized 
authority, with nothing comparable to our press, our independent legislature or 
our ratification process. 
5 . Beware of "[Russians] bearing gifts ." Soviet representatives 
grudgingly acknowledge the necessity of making trades, but view compromise 
as a weakness. They may make cosmetic offers to extract substantive 
concessiOns. 
6. Remember that to the Soviet side form is substance. It believes that the 
size of the negotiating table and having a greater number of representatives 
present are matters of importance. Setting the agenda may preclude an outcome 
desired by the other side. It is an error to dismiss issues viewed as "merely 
procedural." 
7. The concept that Soviet leaders have "paranoid fear of being invaded" is 
a Western myth. It is true that, from an early age, Soviet children are habituated 
to fear being invaded and are imbued with the country's need for large military 
forces, making military production a national priority. However, the Russian 
state did not become a superpower with a vast empire from the Elbe to the 
Pacific by fighting only defensive actions. 
8. Beware of negotiating at the 11th hour. Soviet diplomats are masters of 
11th hour negotiations. They wait until the very end, hoping to put pressure on 
the other side to make concessions simply to complete an agreement, since, to 
an open society, lack of agreement spells "failure." 
9. Pay great attention to semantics , since Soviet representatives try to 
habituate the other side to employing Soviet terminology. Years of dialogue 
with Soviet negotiators have taught me that, like Humpty Dumpty, words mean 
what the Russians want them to mean. They are masters of semantic 
infiltration. 
10. Don't misinterpret the human element. While Soviet negotiators can be 
pleasant and appear conciliatory, in the end they are always tough bargainers 
and quite unsentimental. An apparent meeting of minds one day is often 
repudiated by the next. Warm words outside the negotiation chamber are 
unrelated to actions inside. 
With the arrival of Gorbachev my "lOth commandment"-- don't misinterpret the 
human element -- has become even more important. Gromyko himself best described the 
USSR's leader: He has a nice smile but iron teeth. At the negotiating table we see the teeth 
-- on television the world sees the smile. He is a very smooth operator who has 
surrounded himself with advisors who are experts on the United States, on public relations 
and the media. Consequently, he and his entourage have become much more adept at using 
the media to sell their image abroad. However, remember that, from their perspective, 
glasnost' is a tool, not a matter of human rights. Gorbachev's foremost concern has to be 
his economic and social problems. However, he will not solve them, if, indeed, they are 
given to solution, at the expense of the one factor that secures the position of the party elite 
as creators of the Soviet Union's status as a superpower: nuclear and convential military 
might. Gorbachev is to be respected, but not necessarily trusted. 
Unless one has negotiated with the Soviets as I have for 15 years, it would stretch 
one's credulity to reconcile the vigorous Soviet strategic defense program with Soviet 
rhetoric on SDI. The Soviets have charged that SDI is a US attempt to gain strategic 
superiority, to generate a new round in "the arms race," to "militarize space" and to 
undermine the basis for offensive arms reductions. However, in Geneva, the Soviets have 
shown themselves so far unwilling to engage in constructive discussion of key issues. No 
state is so strong a proponent of strategic defense in practice as the Soviet Union, yet none 
is more strongly opposed to SDI in public. 
Years ago when I was a negotiator in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, my 
Soviet counterpart told me: "We Soviets are neither pacifists nor philanthropists." It is 
through recognizing the truth and candor in this Soviet observation and responding with 
strength and patience that we have made progress in arms control. During the negotiations 
on intermediate-range nuclear forces, the Soviets repeatedly attempted to get us to make 
concessions that were contrary to our security interests. Many times they put forward 
"non-negotiable" demands in attempts to keep unfair advantages. But our patience won out 
and produced an accord that enhances our security through the elimination of a whole class 
of nuclear missiles. 
In conclusion, let me say that if we learn from the Soviet past, we should not be 
surprised in the future. Our systems, culture, history, national experiences and goals are 
very different. Tension and competition between us are the norm -- not the exception. 
Where there is secrecy in the Soviet Union we have often found that the Soviet leaders have 
something to hide. Our responses should be based on Soviet actions, not their words. Our 
approach to the USSR should continue to look first to our security interests as we attempt 
to make progress in all four areas of our complex relationship: arms control, human rights , 
bilateral issues and regional issues. By following such a realistic and measured course, our 
security will continue to be well served. 
